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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL UNFAIR COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES ACT
SIDNEY A. DIAMOND*
In the first session of the 86th Congress, Representative Lindsay
of New York introduced a bill "To provide civil remedies to persons
damaged by unfair commercial activities in or affecting commerce." 1
The text of the bill was the result of almost three full years of study
and drafting by the Committee on Trade Marks and Unfair Compe-
tition of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. An iden-
tical bill was introduced by Mr. Lindsay in the first session of the 87th
Congress, 2 and Senator Javits introduced a companion bill in the Sen-
ate.3 Although no hearings were held on any of these bills, they have
been under careful consideration by various bar and trade associa-
tions. The patient interchange of views among these groups led to
several alterations in language, consisting largely of clarification
rather than changes in substance, and a revised version of the bill now
has been introduced in the second session of the 87th Congress by
Representative Lindsay4 and Senator Javits.5 The full text of the
new bill is set forth here as Appendix A.
This article will explain the reasons why federal legislation is
needed in the field of unfair competition. It will then explore the Lind-
say bill in sufficient detail to show what it is intended to accomplish.
THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE
The desirability of uniform nationwide rules of fair play in
business can scarcely be denied. The increasing speed of transpor-
tation and the ability to reach vast numbers of persons rapidly through
mass media of communication have become commonplace facts of
* Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars; Chairman, Committee on
Trade Marks and Unfair Competition, The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. The author acknowledges with gratitude his deep indebtedness to his present
and former colleagues on the above Committee, whose memoranda, reports, and
minutes have been the basis for much of the contents of this article; and particularly to
his predecessors as Chairman, Harold R. Medina, Jr., who supplied the original in-
spiration for the Lindsay bill and guided its course from the earliest draft through
its initial introduction in the 86th Congress, and Walter H. Free, who bore the brunt
of the first rounds of criticism levelled at the bill.
1 H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
2 H.R. 4590, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
3 S. 1036, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
4 H.R. 10038, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
5 S. 2784, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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modern commercial life. There is a constant tendency for business
organizations to extend their geographical scope.' Marketing regions
are not confined within state boundaries and even some metropolitan
areas are intersected by state lines. Even when the perpetrator of an
unfair trade practice is local in its operation, the company whose
rights are infringed most likely does business on a multi-state scale.
As a rule, therefore, practices coming under the general heading of
unfair competition tend to affect interstate commerce. 7 Nevertheless,
the questions of whether or not they are actionable and what relief a
plaintiff may be entitled to receive are not federal questions; they
must be determined by the law of a particular state even when the
action is brought in a federal court. And the laws of the various states
unfortunately are far from uniform in their treatment of unfair com-
petition.'
The resulting patch-work quilt of conflicting views constitutes a
problem of comparatively recent origin. Until 1938, unfair competi-
tion in the federal courts was treated as a branch of federal common
law. The concept grew slowly, but there was an unmistakable trend
in the direction of increasingly broader protection for commercial
interests against a constantly expanding list of unethical business
practices. Under the vigorous leadership of Judge Learned Hand,
the Second Circuit blazed new trails with notable decisions like Yale
Electric Corp. v. Robertsonf The influence of earlier cases which
had expressed anachronistic views about the protectibility of commer-
cial values' ° was on the wane as federal courts throughout the country
relied on one another's later decisions. It was thus possible to say
that, "By 1938, a progressive and well-reasoned body of federal com-
6 In 1946, the Senate Report on the bill which became the Lanham Act (the
Federal Trademark Act, 60 Stat. 427, 15 U.S.C. § 1051), stated: ". . . trade is no longer
local, but is national." Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
7 "[P]roblems of unfair competition in trade . . . almost invariably . . .
transcend state lines, . . ." Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234
F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956) (per Clark, Ch. J., concurring).
8 See Diggins, "Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks," 14 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 200, 201 (1949); Note, "The Choice of Law in Multistate Unfair Competition:
A Legal-Industrial Enigma," 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315 (1947); Note, "Misrepresentation
and the Lindsay Bill: A Stab at Uniformity in the Law of Unfair Competition," 70 Yale
LJ. 406, 426 (1961).
9 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
10 E.g., Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132 (1927); Borden
Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510 (7th Cir. 1912); American
Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900); Armstrong Cork Co.
v. Ringwalt Linoleum Works, 235 Fed. 458 (D.N.J. 1916); Borden's Condensed Milk Co.
v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 206 Fed. 949 (El). Wisc. 1913); New York & R. Cement
Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 Fed. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1890).
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mon law had developed, the limits of the tort expanding in line with
maturing commercial views of the ethics of competition."'1
The significance of the year 1938 is that it marks the date of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,"2 in which the Supreme Court discarded
a century of jurisprudence by denying the existence of any federal
common law. The rule of Erie is that federal courts having juris-
diction because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties must
apply the law of the state in which they sit. The Supreme Court
subsequently confirmed what was at least implicit in Erie: that the
federal court also is bound to apply the conflict of laws rules of the
forum state.' 3 It also held specifically that the Erie rule includes
unfair competition cases. 4
There is obvious logical justification for the Erie doctrine be-
cause it prevents the accidental availability of federal jurisdiction
from affecting the law applicable to a given controversy. In the spe-
cific field of unfair competition, however, the effect of the Erie de-
cision was drastic and it has been universally deplored. The word
most commonly used to describe the post-Erie status of unfair com-
petition law is "chaos"' 5 and its effect has been called "disastrous"; 6
other writers have referred more calmly to the introduction of "dis-
harmony"'T and "confusion"'1 8 into this important branch of the law.
Even the titles of the articles on the subject reflect the uniform
feeling of dissatisfaction with the application of the Erie doctrine
to the law of unfair competition. Judge Clark used the phrase,
"The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins";19 Philip O'Brien
has written of "The Travails of a Federal Law of Unfair Competi-
tion";10 and the Harvard Law Review described the situation as "A
Legal-Industrial Enigma."'" The only ray of hope appears in the
1 60 Harv. L. Rev. at 1316, supra note 8.
12 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
14 Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942).
15 E.g., Rogers, "Unfair Competition," 35 Trademark Rep. 126, 130 (1945); Note,
"The Federal Law of Unfair Competition," 47 Va. L. Rev. 600, 604 (1961).
16 Supra note 8, 60 Harv. L. Rev. at 1316 (1947).
17 Supra note 8, 70 Yale L.J. at 426 (1961).
18 1 Moore, Federal Practice 3770 (2d ed. 1960).
19 Clark, "State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins," 55 Yale L.J. 267 (1946).
20 O'Brien, "The Travails of a Federal Law of Unfair Competition," 15 Bus. Law.
279 (1960).
21 Supra note 8, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1315 (1947).
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title of a recent paper by Louis Kunin urging support of the Lindsay
bill, "Erieantompkinitis: The Malady and Its Cure."22
It is not surprising that Erie v. Tompkins should have had such
serious consequences in the field of unfair competition. The over-
whelming majority of unfair competition cases, both before and
since Erie, have been brought in the federal rather than the state
courts.2 3 The multi-state nature of the affected business interests
makes the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts available in
most unfair competition situations. In addition, an unfair competition
count frequently is included in cases under the Trademark Act, where
the federal courts have explicit statutory jurisdiction, and in copyright
and patent cases, where the federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion.24 In the days before Erie, the confidence of the bar in the exist-
ence of a cohesive body of federal common law was itself a reason
for instituting unfair competition actions in the federal courts on
the basis of their diversity jurisdiction.2 5
As a result, many of the states never had an opportunity to
develop the law of unfair competition in their own courts and the
small scattering of available precedents often turned out to be very
old and very conservative. 6 Yet, under the Erie rule, the federal
courts were required to search for these archaic decisions and apply
them to current commercial situations. In Illinois, for instance, des-
pite a wealth of comparatively liberal decisions in the federal courts
of the Seventh Circuit, the state rule allowed relief for unfair compe-
tition only in passing-off cases and the federal courts perforce applied
this narrow view after Erie.2"
Great federal cases were deprived of any binding force as pre-
cedents. For example, it is generally considered that International
22 Kunin, "Erieantompkinitis: The Malady and Its Cure," 1961 Proceedings, Am.
Bar. Ass'n Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, 276.
23 See Diggins, supra note 8, at 202; 60 Harv. L. Rev. at 1316 (1947).
24 23 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
25 "It is not surprising that the governing law developed in the federal courts and
much of its doctrine is connected with the names of great federal judges." Maternally
Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1956) (per Clark,
Ch. J., concurring).
26 See, e.g., Moore, op. cit. supra note 18, at 3770; Diggins, supra note 8, at 201-02;
Rogers, "New Concepts of Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act," 38 Trademark
Rep. 259, 263 (1948); Rogers, supra note 15, 35 Trademark Rep. at 130; Note, "De-
velopments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 814,
881 (1955); 47 Va. L. Rev. at 606 (1961).
27 Discussed in Derenberg, "The Influence of the French Code Civil on the Modem
Law of Unfair Competition," 4 Am. 3. Comp. L. 1, 31 (1955); and Diggins, supra note
8, at 204.
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News Service v. Associated Press2 (despite a number of decisions
limiting it to its facts) is the foundation-stone of the doctrine of
misappropriation in the modern law of unfair competition. Never-
theless, a federal district court just a few months ago was able to
write with complete accuracy:2 9
Although the International News case is undoubtedly a lead-
ing one in the field of unfair competition, it was an enunciation of
so-called federal common law made prior to Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, which
held that in diversity cases, decision must rest, not upon any fed-
eral common law, but upon applicable state law, both decisional
and statutory.
International News Service therefore, is no longer controlling
in diversity cases, and its relevance to the pending diversity cases
depends upon the extent to which the Courts of Idaho, where the
practices of defendants occur, have adopted or would adopt its
doctrine.
It is worthy of note that, after Erie, the prior federal decisions
had no controlling effect on either the state or the federal courts."0
This enormous and highly valuable body of precedent had been wiped
out except to the extent that some state might choose to follow it on
the basis of reason, or some federal court might be able to find a
basis in state law for looking to the federal decisions for guidance.
From the standpoint of the litigant, unfair competition law had been
confused and set back, whether relief was sought in the federal or
the state courts.
One particularly glaring anomaly created by Erie was the need
to apply state law to an unfair competition claim even when it is
pendent to a federal statutory claim of trademark infringement. It
is extremely common for such claims to arise together and to be
joined in a single federal court complaint; fundamentally, the law
of trademarks is only a part of the broader law of unfair competi-
tion.3' So far as registered trademarks are concerned, the Trademark
Act of 1946,32 a federal statute founded upon the commerce clause
of the Constitution, at least provides a basis for uniform treatment
28 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
20 Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196
F. Supp. 315, 321-22 (D. Ida. 1961). See, also, the dramatic turnabout of Judge Knox
in Remick Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 57 F. Supp. 475, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y.
1944); Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79 (1946), where
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision relied upon by judge Knox.
30 Rogers, supra note 15, 35 Trademark Rep. at 130.
3' United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
32 60 Stat. 427, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1946).
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in all federal courts throughout the country3 3 The related claim of
unfair competition, however, must be considered separately even
though it necessarily is based upon substantially the same facts in
order to qualify for pendent jurisdiction.34 Although there have been
some contrary statements, 3 it now appears to be settled that a pen-
dent unfair competition claim invokes the same rules of law that
would be applicable if it had come before the federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship.3" Accordingly, the court in such
a case must perform the schizoid task of determining the trademark
infringement claim under federal law and the related unfair competi-
tion claim under state law.
The difficulties created by the application of the Erie decision
to the field of unfair competition are compounded in multi-state sit-
uations by conflicts of laws rules. What has become the classic demon-
stration of this phase of the problem is to be found in Ettore v.
Philco Television Broadcasting Corp.,37 a case instituted in a federal
court sitting in Pennsylvania, where the Court of Appeals said:
We find therefore in substance that the states in which Ettore
asserts his rights were injured are Pennsylvania, Delaware, New
Jersey, and New York. We must now look to Pennsylvania law with
regard to the alleged injuries in Pennsylvania and, under the Penn-
sylvania conflict of laws rule, to the laws of Delaware and New
Jersey as to the Pennsylvania telecasts and to the law of New York
as to the New York telecasts, to determine what damage, if any,
Ettore suffered in each of these jurisdictions.
Such unnecessary and artificial complexities dramatize the need
for uniformity. The need is compelling even when the defendant's
activities are limited to a single state, because the plaintiff should
be entitled to the same degree of protection for its multi-state business
no matter where the tortious acts occur or where the action happens
33 Even though the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal
courts in cases involving infringement of registered trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a),
the states are obliged to apply federal law in determining issues arising under the
Trademark Act. Brown & Bigelow v. Remembrance Advertising Products, Inc., 279
App. Div. 410, 110 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1st Dept. 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 909, 110 N.E.2d
736 (1953).
34 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b).
35 E .g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass. 1947).
36 Kemart Corp. v. Printing Art Research Laboratories, Inc., 269 F.2d 375, 389
(9th Cir. 1959), and cases cited; National Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co.,
47 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944).
37 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) ; cf., Purcell v. Sum-
mers, 145 F.2d 979, 989 (4th Cir. 1944): "Unfair competition is a tort governed by the
law of the state where it occurs. If it occurs in a number of states it must be dealt with
in accordance with their laws; ..."
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to be brought. More fundamentally, it seems obvious that "a single,
nationwide yardstick by which business conduct may be measured"3
is the only suitable approach to the law of unfair competition in view
of "the complexity of modern commercial relations, and the national
scope of most large business operations." 9
The attempts which have been made to construct a federal law
of unfair competition under existing legislation by various theories
of interpretation are outside the scope of this article. Suffice it to say
that these theories either have failed to win acceptance by the courts
or have proved to be inadequate to correct the situation created by
Erie.4" However, the fact that such determined and elaborate efforts
have been made is itself evidence of the deep desire for uniform
treatment of unfair trade practices on a nationwide basis.
There appears to be no dissent from the view that uniformity in
unfair competition law is necessary. Judge Clark has written of
the need for "a complete and uniform law";"' Professor Moore has
called for "uniformity," saying that "the law of one state, whether
it be its domestic or conflicts rule, should not govern multi-state
activities"; 42 and Philip O'Brien speaks of "the need for a federal
law of unfair competition" as "axiomatic.143 The Harvard Law Re-
view says that, "Such uniformity is acutely necessary"; 44 the Yale
Law Journal calls for "a uniform law of unfair competition" to re-
place "the fifty separate bodies of state law and the vestiges of
federal common law presently occupying this field";'G and the Vir-
ginia Law Review states that there is "a clear need on the part of the
businessman for uniform national protection."4
Although there is no disagreement about the need for uniformity,
differing views have been expressed from time to time about the
38 60 Harv. L. Rev. supra note 8, at 1322 (1947).
39 70 Yale L.. supra note 8, at 437 (1961).
40 See, e.g., discussion in Kunin, supra note 22, at 278-80. Diggins, supra note 8,
at 218-19, expressed the view in 1949 that the Lanham Act made unfair competition
a matter of federal law and eliminated most of the effects of the Erie decision in unfair
competition cases; he wrote hopefully that, "after a relatively few years, it may be
expected that the state law of trade-marks and unfair competition will be of little
more than historical interest." Unfortunately, the prophecy proved untrue.
41 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc. 234 F.2d 538, 547 (2d
Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
42 Moore, op. cit. supra note 18, at 3773.
43 O'Brien, supra note 20, at 288; id. at n.39.
44 60 Harv. L. Rev. supra note 8, at 1322 (1947).
45 70 Yale L.J. supra note 8, at 437 (1961); cf., 68 Harv. L. Rev. at 881 (1955),
supra note 26.
46 Supra note 15, 47 Va. L. Rev. at 600 (1961).
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means for achieving the desired end. The trend appears to be
strongly in the direction of a federal statute on the subject, but
efforts to prepare a uniform state unfair competition statute also are
going forward. 7 There would not be any theoretical impediment
in the way of adopting both federal and state statutes, but a single
federal law would appear to represent a more efficient approach to
the problem.
The late Edward S. Rogers, acknowledged dean of the trademark
bar and the chief architect of the Lanham Trademark Act, suggested
as long ago as 1945 that "there might be a statute making actionable
those acts of unfair competition which are recognized to be such by
enlightened world opinion."48 Mr. Rogers apparently was contem-
plating a uniform state statute at the time, but, following the passage
of the Lanham Act, he rephrased his suggestion in terms of a "Federal
Code of Unfair Competition."49 The basis for congressional power
in the Rogers proposal was to have been derived from the adherence
of the United States to various international conventions which in-
clude provisions against unfair competition in broad general terms."
It was subsequently said that, "A more secure choice as the basis
of congressional power would be the interstate commerce clause. '51
This is the approach taken in the Lindsay bill, on the theory that,
in the light of the multi-state nature of most modern business transac-
tions, expanded concepts of the limit of federal power to legislate con-
cerning acts affecting commerce would extend the reach of such a
statute to all but an insignificant number of unfair competition
situations.
THE. LINDSAY BILL
1. Intent and Scope
The purpose of the Lindsay bill is stated clearly in section 9,
the first part of which reads:
The intent of this Act is to regulate all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress by making actionable solely in
a Federal forum all unfair commercial activities set forth herein
thereby to protect any person engaged in interstate commerce
47 Fuller, "A Proposed Uniform State Unfair Competition Act," 1961 Proceedings,
Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law 272; cf., Lunsford, "Un-
fair Competition: Uniform State Act Needed," 44 Va. L. Rev. 583 (1958).
48 Rogers, supra note 15, 35 Trademark Rep. at 131. See, generally, Derenberg,
"The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes," 44 Calif. L. Rev.
439 (1956).
49 Rogers, supra note 26, 38 Trademark Rep. at 271.
50 Id. at 272-73.
51 60 Harv. L. Rev. supra note 8, at 1323 (1947).
1962]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
against such unfair commercial activities whether used or com-
mitted locally or in interstate commerce.
This language obviously is designed to invoke the fullest possible
scope of congressional power under the interstate commerce clause
of the Constitution. It is somewhat reminiscent of the statement of
intent incorporated in the Lanham Act,52 but even more explicit
in its terms.
The reference in section 9 to exclusive federal jurisdiction is
carried into effect by section 8, which grants original and appellate
jurisdiction of all actions arising under the Act to the federal courts,
without regard to diversity of citizenship or jurisdictional amount.
The text of section 8 is essentially a combination of Sections 39 and 40
of the Lanham Act,5" with the important addition of the word "sole."
As we have noted earlier, the state and federal courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction of trademark cases; 5 4 the Lindsay bill, however,
specifically negatives concurrent state jurisdiction of actions brought
under its terms.
This does not mean that state law is discarded. Section 4 of
the Lindsay bill provides that the relief available under the Act "shall
be in addition to and not in exclusion of those rights and remedies
otherwise available under the common law or pursuant to the statutes
of any state or of the United States." Section 4 goes on to state
explicitly that the Act shall not be construed in such a way as to
preempt the jurisdiction of any state to grant relief against unfair
commercial activities.
The net effect of these provisions is to create a new right of action
cognizable exclusively in the federal courts, but at the same time
to preserve existing state law in the same field. A plaintiff who wished
to invoke state law would be free to proceed in the state court.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that a plaintiff might bring an action
under the new Act in a federal district court and join with it a claim
for relief under applicable state law. If the hopes of the draftsmen
of the bill are realized, state unfair competition law will become
increasingly unimportant, but there was no wish to revoke it by a
federal occupation of the field. On the contrary, it is hoped that
some of our more liberal states will continue to hold their present
positions as leaders in the development of an expanding law of unfair
trade practices. The main purpose of the new statute nevertheless
is the creation of a uniform body of federal law.
52 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("Intent of Act").
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1122.
54 Supra note 33.
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2. The Substantive Offense
The heart of the Lindsay bill is section 2, which lists the "unfair
commercial activities" that are made actionable. The expression
"unfair commercial activities" was selected deliberately because
it was felt that "unfair competition" might be construed as a limitation.
Although "unfair competition" is used as a term of art in much of the
literature, the unfortunate result of emphasis in numerous cases on
the need for a showing of actual competition, in addition to a showing
of unfairness, led the draftsmen of the bill to choose a new term. In
order to provide additional assurance of a broad construction for the
new statute, section 3 states flatly that "Absence of competition be-
tween the parties.., shall not be a defense to an action brought under
this Act." Section 3 also assures the widest possible access to the bene-
fits of the Act by providing that no showing of actual damage shall be
a prerequisite to relief and that absence of any public interest in the
subject-matter of the action shall not constitute a defense.
Section 2 contains just four subsections. This list of actionable
unfair commercial activities represents a carefully chosen compro-
mise. On the one hand, it would be a practical impossibility to
define in detail every type of conduct sought to be prohibited; an
attempt to do so would have created an environment in which defen-
dants constantly could have sought justification for their acts under
the expressio unius rule. As the United States Supreme Court
has said:m
An enumeration, however comprehensive, of existing methods of
unfair competition must necessarily prove incomplete, as with new
conditions constantly arising, novel unfair methods would be
devised and developed.
On the other hand, a simple statement that all unfair acts shall be
deemed unlawful would not have been sufficiently precise to serve
as a basis for the desired uniformity of decision throughout the
federal judicial system.
Section 2(a) is framed in terms of the "commission" of an act
or practice, or the "use" of a statement. This introductory language
was drafted with the intention of embracing all forms of activity,
including the unfair use of a statement prepared by a third party.
There are three parts to subsection (a); the first two of these cover
confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the de-
fendant, and confusion as to the origin, source, or sponsorship of
the goods or services of the defendant. The concept of confusion
5 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 437 (1920).
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is the basis of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act;
the Lindsay bill would extend this concept to confusion caused by
means other than the use of colorable imitations of a trademark.
In addition, section 2(a) (2) would codify the law of confusion of
sponsorship, which has developed (under that designation) largely
in cases involving questions of the registrability of trademarks, 7
and make it available in non-trademark cases as well.
Section 2(a) (3) would be a federal anti-dilution statute, paral-
leling similar provisions adopted by several of the states in recent
years."" This liberal doctrine thus would become available in any
trademark or trade name case where interstate commerce
was affected.
Section 2(b) prohibits the use of false or misleading statements
about the goods or services of either party. It is limited to statements
"of fact" in order to avoid prohibiting anyone from stating his
opinion. Since section 2(b) applies to statements about the goods
or services of "either party," it covers not only false advertising of
what the defendant is offering, but also trade libel or disparagement
directed against the plaintiff's products or services. Doubts about
the availability of injunctive relief against disparagement, caused
by false analogies to libel and slander, thus would be removed. 9
Section 2(b) specifically contemplates the possibility that a statement
may be false or misleading by reason of the omission of a material
fact as well as by an actual misstatement of fact. In this respect,
it resembles the definition of a false advertisement in the Federal
Trade Commission Act.60
Section 2(c) is a deliberate catch-all. It is directed against
"the commission for purposes of profit of any other act or practice
which is likely to deceive or which violates reasonable standards
of commercial ethics." This is reminiscent of the final subsection
of the comparable provision in the "Federal Code of Unfair Compe-
tition" proposed by Edward S. Rogers in 1948, which read: "Any
other act or deed contrary to good faith or honorable commercial
56 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
57 E.g., National Lead Co. v. Michigan Bulb Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 115 (Comm'r
1959); Cowles Magazines, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 115 U.S.P.Q. 92 (Comm'r 1957);
Copacabana, Inc. v. Breslauer, 101 U.S.P.Q. 467 (Comm'r 1954).
58 Ga. Sess. Laws 1955, at 453; Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 140, § 4a (1953); Mass. Laws
Ann. c. 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-c(3).
59 E.g., in Eversharp, Inc. v. Pal Blade Co., 182 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1950), the court,
applying New York law, felt compelled to deny injunctive relief.
60 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1); cf. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) ("misbranded" articles under the
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act).
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usage."" Mr. Rogers, in turn, traced his language to Article 10,
paragraph 2, of the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property,6 2 which provides: "Any act of competition con-
trary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters consti-
tutes an act of unfair competition"; and to Article 20 of the Pan-
American Trade-Mark Convention, 3 which provides: "Every act or
deed contrary to commercial good faith or to the normal and honor-
able development of industrial or business activities shall be considered
as unfair competition and, therefore, unjust and prohibited."
The use of the expression "reasonable standards of commercial
ethics" in section 2 (c) is intended to provide federal judges with the
opportunity to apply the liberal standards of such decisions as Dior v.
Milton, where Mr. Justice Greenberg of the New York State Supreme
Court wrote:04
The modern view as to the law of unfair competition does not
rest solely on the ground of direct competitive injury, but on the
broader principle that property rights of commercial value are to be
and will be protected from any form of unfair invasion or infringe-
ment and from any form of commercial immorality, and a court of
equity will penetrate and restrain every guise resorted to by the
wrongdoer.
Section 2(c) should make it clear that federal judges are free
from the hampering effects of any archaic rulings in the states where
they sit, or in their federal circuits. It was planned purposely to be a
general provision of the type that "authorizes federal courts to fashion
a body of federal law" in the field of unfair commercial activities. 65
Section 2 (c) already has been criticized for being too broad, on the
theory that individual judges would not be given sufficient direction
and thus that the goal of uniformity would not be realized.6 Rudolf
61 Rogers, supra note 26, 38 Trademark Rep. at 271.
62 Convention of the Union of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property,
March 20, 18S3, as amended, reprinted at 5 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-
Marks 2509, 2518 (2d ed. 1950).
63 Pan-American Trade-Mark Convention, Feb. 20, 1929, reprinted at 5 Callmann
op. cit. supra note 62, at 2487, 2493.
04 Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 434, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 455 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
nem., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956).
65 Cf., Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957),
interpreting § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 156,
29 U.S.C. § 185), which provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties."
66 70 Yale LJ. supra note 8, at 439-40 (1961).
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Callmann anticipated this criticism; he states that, "The success of
the European courts in developing a common law of unfair competi-
tion under such a broad clause refutes the argument that such a pro-
vision is meaningless or even dangerous."6 7
Section 2 concludes with a provision against the institution in bad
faith of an action under the new act itself. This was felt to be an ob-
viously desirable protective feature.
In summary, section 2 has for its purpose the establishment of
guideposts for the federal courts that are explicit enough to identify
the principal types of unlawful activity and yet will allow the flexibility
that is essential in a field where rapid technological advances in busi-
ness and communications constantly create new opportunities for ex-
ploitation by the unscrupulous few.
Section 7 limits the substantive offense by providing that the act
is not to be so construed as to "extend or enlarge the rights and rem-
edies provided under the patent or copyright laws of the United
States." The purpose of this provision is to guard against possible
attempts that might otherwise be made to use the new statute as a
device for increasing the scope or duration of a patent or copyright
monopoly. This is not to say that a claim for unfair commercial
activities cannot be joined with a claim for patent or copyright infringe-
ment; on the contrary, it is quite likely that many such related claims
would be brought, just as common law unfair competition claims fre-
quently are joined with patent and copyright infringement claims
under present law.
Trademarks are not mentioned in section 7 because they stand
on a different footing from copyrights and patents. The Lindsay bill
does broaden the rights of trademark proprietors. And the possible
criticism about extending the duration of the right that might have
been made with respect to copyrights and patents is inapplicable to
trademarks; they remain valid indefinitely so long as they continue
to be used. s
3. Relief
The scope of relief under the Act is set forth in section 1. The
right of action is for an injunction; no damages may be recovered.
There are two main reasons for the limitation to injunctive relief.
It is believed that plaintiffs in most cases of this nature are interested
primarily in bringing about the cessation of the unlawful acts rather
than in collecting damages, which may be difficult to prove even in
the best of circumstances. Furthermore, the absence of any provision
67 1 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 62, at § 4.3, n.78.23 (Supp. 1961).
,s See 15 U.S.C. § 1059.
[Vol. 23
UNFAIR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES ACT
for damages should prevent the use of the new right of action as the
basis for "strike" suits. At the same time, a party with a genuine
claim should not be deterred from bringing an action because of its
expense; accordingly, section 1 provides for reasonable attorneys' fees
in the discretion of the court, in addition to taxable costs and disburse-
ments. Such a judgment is available not merely to a successful plain-
tiff, but to the "prevailing party," so that a successful defendant also
is entitled to make an application for counsel fees, as well as to recover
statutory costs and disbursements.
Any person damaged or "likely to be damaged" is entitled to
bring an action under section 1. The quoted expression is borrowed
from Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act;69 however, the Lindsay bill
purposely did not carry over from the Lanham Act the troublesome
concept "believes that he is" damaged. 7 The words "damaged or"
were inserted to avoid any possible argument that the new statute
applied only to a situation in which no damage had yet occurred. On
the other hand, as already noted, section 3 makes it clear that actual
damage is not a prerequisite to suit.
Innocent publishers and broadcasters are protected by section 5,
which makes the absence of knowledge or intent a defense in an action
against such a party in respect of the contents of "any news, literary,
educational, advertising or entertainment medium." Furthermore,
in order to avoid unnecessarily severe economic consequences to pub-
lishers, broadcasters and motion picture producers, section 6 provides
that relief under the statute shall not be available when the injunction
would delay the dissemination of a particular issue of a periodical,
broadcast of a radio or television program, or the showing of a motion
picture, after the regularly scheduled time therefor. An adjudication
that a single advertisement in a magazine was false, for example,
would not hold up distribution of the entire issue even if the pub-
lisher did have knowledge; but the use of the same or similar
advertisements in future issues could be enjoined. This protective
feature is limited to a situation where the delay would be due to the
method by which dissemination is customarily conducted in accordance
with sound business practice, as distinguished from a device to evade
the statute. These provisions are similar to those contained in Sec-
tion 32(2) of the Lanham Act7' and also resemble Section 13(b) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.72
69 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); d. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063, 1064.
70 Ibid.
71 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2).
72 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
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4. Miscellaneous Provisions
The rest of the Lindsay bill consists of relatively minor provisions.
Section 9, in addition to the statement of intent discussed previously,
contains a number of definitions, most of which require no comment.
The definition of "trademark" is a compendious one; it incorporates
the Lanham Act definitions of "trademark," "service mark," "cer-
tification mark," and "collective mark. ' 7'  The definition of "trade
name" is substantially identical with that contained in the Lanham
Act.7
4
Section 10 is the customary saving clause for partial invalidity.
Section 12 provides a short title for the act. Section 11, although not
at all unusual, is more significant; it provides that the new statute
shall take effect immediately upon its enactment, but that it shall
not affect any suit, proceeding or appeal then pending.
CONCLUSION
The Lindsay bill has been described as "a direct, workable means
for alleviating the harm created by Erie v. Tompkins in the field of
unfair competition. ' 75 In writing about the bill shortly after it was
first introduced in 1959, Professor Derenberg said: 76
It has repeatedly been suggested that the only satisfactory solution
to the problem [of an effective federal law of unfair competition]
would be the enactment of federal legislation under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, which would specifically deal with
all forms of unfair commercial activities.
He added, "Although the Lindsay bill may not remain in its
present form, it may well serve as a stimulant for further study and
perhaps eventual ultimate enactment of a federal unfair competition
statute. 7 7 Two years later, Professor Derenberg was able to say that
the Lindsay bill "has almost unanimous support from all professional
groups."78 In its current form, the bill has been revised to meet a
number of objections and criticisms; it is possible that Congress will
hold hearings on it this year.
Those who have worked to bring the Lindsay bill to its present
stage are hopeful that it will make a genuine contribution to clarity
73 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
74 Ibid.
75 Kunin, supra note 22, at 284.
76 Derenberg, "The Twelfth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946," 49 Trademark Rep. 1019, 1087-88 (1959).
77 Id. at 1088.
78 Derenberg, "The Fourteenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946," 51 Trademark Rep. 777, 778 (1961).
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and uniformity in a branch of the law that directly affects commercial
and consumer interests of enormous economic and moral significance
in the life of the country. Additional support from the bar will help
assure the passage of a measure the need for which has been widely
proclaimed for almost twenty-five years.
APPENDIX A
A BrLL
To provide civil remedies to persons damaged by unfair com-
mercial activities in or affecting commerce
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That any person damaged
or likely to be damaged by unfair commercial activities in or affecting
commerce shall be entitled to an injunction in a civil action brought by
that person against any person who has engaged in such activities. The
prevailing party in any such action also shall be entitled to judgment for
taxable costs and disbursements and, in the discretion of the court, reason-
able attorneys' fees.
Sec. 2. Unfair commercial activities under this Act shall be-
(a) the commission of any act or practice or the use of any statement
which is likely (1) to cause confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of the person charged therewith or (2) to cause confusion as
to the origin, source, or sponsorship of the goods or services of such person
or (3) to dilute the distinctive quality of a trademark or trade name of
another;
(b) the use for purposes of profit of any statement of fact as to the
goods or services of either party which is false or misleading by reason
either of misstatement or omission of a material fact;
(c) the commission for purposes of profit of any other act or practice
which is likely to deceive or which violates reasonable standards of com-
mercial ethics; or
(d) the institution of an action under this Act in bad faith.
Sec. 3. Absence of competition between the parties, of actual damage
to the person seeking protection, or of a public interest in such unfair
commercial activities shall not be a defense to an action brought under this
Act.
Sec. 4. The relief provided for by this Act shall be in addition to and
not in exclusion of those rights and remedies otherwise available under
the common law or pursuant to the statutes of any state or of the United
States. Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to preempt the juris-
diction of any state to grant relief in cases of unfair commercial activities.
Sec. 5. Absence of knowledge or intent shall be a defense to any action
brought under this Act against a publisher or broadcaster in respect of any
contents of any news, literary, educational, advertising, or entertainment
medium.
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Sec. 6. Relief shall not be available under this Act in respect of an
issue of a newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical, the broadcast
of any radio or television program, or the showing of any motion picture
when restraining the appearance or performance of any particular issue
of such periodical, program, or picture would delay its dissemination after
the regular time therefor, and such delay would be due to the method by
which dissemination is customarily conducted in accordance with sound
business practice and not to any method or device adopted for the evasion
of this Act or to prevent or delay the issuance of an injunction or restraining
order.
Sec. 7. This Act shall not be construed so as to extend or enlarge
the rights and remedies provided under the patent or copyright laws of
the United States.
Sec. 8. The district and Territorial courts of the United States shall
have sole original jurisdiction and the circuit courts of appeal of the
United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia shall have sole appellate jurisdiction, of all actions whatsoever
under this Act without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity
or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties. Writs of certiorari
may be granted by the Supreme Court of the United States for the review
of cases arising under this Act.
Sec. 9. The intent of this Act is to regulate all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress by making actionable solely in a Federal
forum all unfair commercial activities set forth herein thereby to protect any
person engaged in interstate commerce against such unfair commercial
activities whether used or committed locally or in interstate commerce.
In the construction of this Act, unless the contrary is plainly apparent
from the context-
1. The term "person" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, union, or other organization capable of suing or being sued in
a court of law.
2. The term "commerce" means all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress.
3. Words used in the singular include the plural and vice versa.
4. The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device
or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or mer-
chant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured
or sold by others, any mark used in the sale or advertising of services to
identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services
of others, including without limitation the marks, names, symbols, titles,
designations, slogans, character names, and distinctive features of radio
or other advertising used in commerce, any mark used upon or in con-
nection with the products or services of one or more persons other than
the owner of the mark to certify regional or other origin, material, mode
of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such goods
or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed
by members of a union or other organization or any mark used by the
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members of a cooperative, an association or other collective group or
organization, including marks used to indicate membership in a union, an
association, or other organization.
5. The term "trade name" includes individual names and surnames,
firm names and trade names used by manufacturers, industrialists, mer-
chants, agriculturists, and others to identify their businesses, vocations, or
occupations or the names or titles lawfully adopted and used by persons,
firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufactur-
ing, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or other organizations engaged
in trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court of
law.
Sec. 10. If any provision of this Act or the application of such pro-
vision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this
Act shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 11. This Act shall be in force and take effect immediately upon
its enactment but shall not affect any suit, proceeding or appeal then
pending.
Sec. 12. This Act may be cited as the "Unfair Commercial Activities
Act."
